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Conditional Conservatism and Labor Investment Efficiency 
ABSTRACT 
Prior literature documents that asymmetric timely recognition of losses versus gains (also 
known as conditional conservatism) can induce management to make more efficient investment 
decisions by mitigating information asymmetry between management and investors and providing 
early signals about the profitability of projects undertaken. In this paper, we investigate the impact 
of conservatism on an important investment decision that has been overlooked, namely investment 
in labor. We find that conservatism is negatively associated with labor investment inefficiency; 
more specifically, conservatism reduces inefficiency investment practices on the labor market, 
including over-hiring, under-firing, under-hiring, and over-firing. Our results hold after controlling 
for managerial ability, corporate governance and other investments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In Basu’s (1997) seminal work, conditional conservatism (hereafter, conservatism) is 
interpreted as companies’ reporting of earnings reflecting “bad news” more quickly than “good 
news”, implying systematic differences in reporting earnings between bad news and good news 
periods. Prior literature documents that conservatism can induce management to make more 
efficient investment decisions on the capital market by mitigating information asymmetry between 
management and investors and providing early signals about the profitability of projects 
undertaken (García Lara, Osma, and Penalva 2016). In this study, we investigate the impact of 
conservatism on another important investment decision that has been overlooked, namely 
investment on the labor market. 
Labor investment efficiency is worthwhile to study for three reasons. First, labor is a 
significant cost component of business operations. Improving labor investment efficiency would 
tell much about a firm’s overall investment behavior. Labor cost typically represents two-thirds of 
economy-wide value added (Bernanke 2004). Specifically, human capital plays an increasingly 
important role as the information and technology industries dominate the world economy (Pfeffer 
1996; Zingales 2000). Second, the adjustment costs associated with labor are relatively lower than 
capital expenditures (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Jung, Lee, and Weber 2014). Due to its variable 
nature, labor investment is liquid and reversible. Managers may thus have greater discretion in 
hiring and firing decisions. Its variable nature also implies that labor investments can vary 
significantly from year to year, providing a natural and powerful setting to examine the variation 
in labor investment efficiency. Third, since all firms have employees, a broad cross-sectional 
sample of firms can be easily available, allowing research questions to be tested in a more general 
setting.  
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We posit that conservatism improves labor investment efficiency through at least four 
channels. First, conservatism would mitigate labor inefficiency through reducing the information 
asymmetry between managers and capital providers about a firm’s optimal level of labor 
investment; it would also provide early signals about the profitability of projects undertaken. 
Second, by imposing timely recognition of losses, conservatism would act as a disciplining 
mechanism to prevent or deter inefficient investments. Third, given that conservatism discourages 
managerial empire-building agendas by constraining wasteful investments, more conservative 
firms will exhibit less over-hiring or under-firing labor practices. Fourth, conservatism can 
promote long-term orientation on investment decisions and conservative firms are likely to make 
more efficient labor investments due to their long-term orientation.  
 To proxy for conservatism, we use a firm-specific measure following the approach of 
Khan and Watts (2009) based on Banker, Basu, Byzalov, and Chen (2016) model, which is the 
modified version of Basu’s (1997) piecewise linear regression model that parses out the effect of 
asymmetric cost behavior. More specifically, asymmetric cost behavior indicates the phenomenon 
where costs rise more in response to sales increases than they fall for sales decreases. Banker, Basu, 
Byzalov, and Chen (2016) argue that without controlling for the asymmetric response of costs to 
sales increases versus decreases, Basu’s (1997) piecewise linear regression may erroneously detect 
reporting conservatism when it actually implies cost stickiness. To proxy for labor investment 
efficiency, we follow Pinnuck and Lillis (2007) and use the absolute values of abnormal net hiring, 
which is estimated as the deviation of actual net hiring from its expected level.  
We find that conservatism is negatively associated with labor investment inefficiency and 
thus conservative financial reporting would improve labor investment efficiency. We document 
that conservatism improves labor investment efficiency by mitigating all four types of labor 
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investment inefficiency, including over-hiring, under-firing, under-hiring, and over-firing. Our 
results hold after controlling for managerial ability, corporate governance and other investments.  
This study makes several contributions. First, the results of this study contribute to the 
emerging literature that examines how financial reporting affects firms’ investment decisions, and 
specifically, how accounting conservatism affects firms’ investment efficiency in labor. This study 
provides direct evidence on the relationship between accounting information and labor investment 
efficiency. Second, despite the prior literature on the effect of conservatism on capital formation, 
how conservative accounting affects labor investment decisions is largely unknown. This paper 
fills in this research gap by investigating how conservatism affects labor investment efficiency, 
which is a primary component of production. Third, Jung, Lee and Weber (2014) investigate the 
relationship between accruals quality and labor investment efficiency by looking at the abnormal 
net hiring/firing based on the labor investment model developed by Pinnuck and Lillis (2007). Our 
study also contributes to this line of research by providing evidence that another important attribute 
of financial reporting quality, namely, timely recognition of losses (conservatism), can improve 
labor investment efficiency. Compared to accruals quality, conservatism can be a more direct 
disciplinary mechanism that induces management to make efficient labor investment decisions. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the prior literature. Section 3 
develops the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the research design. Section 5 presents the findings 
on empirical analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Agency Problem and Labor Investment Efficiency 
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Agency theory suggests that due to the misalignment of interests between shareholders and 
managers, managers may engage in opportunistic activities for their own benefits rather than for 
shareholders’ benefits (Jensen and Meckling 1976). One of the most prominent aspects of the 
agency problem is managerial empire building, that is, managers increase the size of the firm 
beyond the optimal level or maintain underutilized resources to increase personal benefits from 
prestige, power and compensation (Jensen 1986). Besides, managers may not exert as much effort 
as they would in a first-best world (Holmstr¨om 1979). Prior literature linking the agency problem 
to corporate investments investigates merger and acquisition (Titman, Wei and Xie 2004; Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith 2007; Masulis, Wang and Xie 2007) or capital investments (Biddle and Hillary 
2006; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Biddle, Hilary and Verdi 2009). These studies link corporate 
investments to various monitoring mechanisms to mitigate agency conflicts, including corporate 
governance, financial reporting quality, or external monitoring provided by analysts. However, the 
literature on corporate investment behavior mostly overlooks labor investment despite its 
economic significance.1 
There is some evidence that corporate governance shapes labor practices including worker 
pay and hiring/firing decisions. For example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999) argue that 
entrenched managers are likely to pay higher wages to workers and are reluctant to trim an 
unproductive workforce in order to enjoy private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining 
and garner employee loyalty. They test this claim by using antitakeover legislation as a proxy for 
weakened corporate governance and find consistent evidence that affected firms’ wages rise with 
the passage of antitakeover laws. Similarly, Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos 
(2009) find that CEOs with more control pay higher wages to workers and this tendency is more 
                         
1
 The U.S. Census Bureau’s annual survey of Manufacturers reveal that payroll and employee benefits totaled $785 
billion for 2008, compared to $166 billion in capital expenditures. 
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pronounced if workers are closer to the CEO in hierarchy, geographically closer to headquarters, 
and associated with a conflict-inclined labor union. These results indicate that managers have their 
preferred set of labor policies and that corporate governance plays an important role in labor 
market outcomes.  
Some recent studies investigate the link between monitoring mechanisms and labor 
investment. For example, Jung, Lee, and Weber (2014) find hiring behavior varies with financial 
reporting quality. More specifically, they find that high quality financial reporting can serve to 
mitigate agency conflicts and improve investment efficiency. Based on the fact that Selling, 
General and Administrative (SG&A) costs largely capture the overhead costs incurred in the 
corporate offices (e.g., office payroll and expenses), another closely related research is Chen, Hope, 
Li, and Wang (2011) who focus on SG&A cost asymmetry to shed light on the impact of the 
agency problem on corporate resources allocation. According to Anderson, Banker, and 
Janakiraman (2003), SG&A cost behave asymmetrically, that is, they increase rapidly in response 
to the increased demand while they decrease slowly in response to the decreased demand. Drawing 
on the empire building literature and SG&A cost asymmetry, Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang (2011) 
find that SG&A costs asymmetry increases with the managers’ empire building incentives due to 
the agency problem, and that strong corporate governance mitigates the effects of the agency 
problem on SG&A cost asymmetry.  
More recently, Ghaly, Dang, and Stathopoulos (2015) investigate how the investment 
horizon of a firm’s institutional shareholders affects the efficiency of its labor investments and 
find that long-term investors have greater incentives to engage in effective monitoring, which 
reduces agency conflicts in labor investment choices. Besides, Ben-Nasr and Alshwer (2016) find 
that labor investment efficiency is positively related to stock price informativeness. They argue 
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that stock prices include information that managers do not possess such as information about future 
investment and growth opportunities, future demand of the firm’s products and services, and 
financing opportunities, which may affect labor investment decisions. Also, more informative 
stock prices are associated with better external and/or internal monitoring of managers, and hence, 
mitigate the empire-building problem on the labor market (such as over-hiring or under-firing).  
2.2. Conservatism as a Corporate Governance Mechanism  
Conservatism is viewed as requiring higher verification standards for recognizing good 
news than bad news (Basu 1997; Watts 2003a, 2003b). Previous research provides ample evidence 
on the positive governance aspect of conditional conservatism. For example, Ahmed and Duellman 
(2011) find a positive association between conservatism and board independence. García Lara, 
Osma, and Penalva (2009) find a positive association between conservatism and corporate 
governance. Also, conservative reporting is believed to alleviate adverse moral hazard problems 
in the presence of information asymmetry and agency costs associated with low managerial 
ownership (Roychowdhury and Watts 2007; LaFond and Watts 2008). Focusing on the banking 
industry, Leventis, Dimitropoulos, and Owusu-Ansah (2013) find that well-governed banks 
engage in significantly higher levels of conditional conservatism in their financial reporting 
practices, suggesting that accounting conservatism serves as a complement to corporate 
governance in mitigating the opaqueness and intense information asymmetry that plague banks. 
In the area of investment efficiency, Francis and Martin (2010) document that conservatism 
is associated with more efficient acquisition and divestiture decisions, and this benefit is more 
pronounced among firms bearing high agency costs. Louis, Sun and Urcan (2012) examine how 
conservatism affects the market value of excess cash. Since excess cash has the potential to be 
wasted, the market value of one additional dollar of excess cash holdings is less than a dollar. They 
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find that conservative reporting can mitigate the value discount associated with large cash holdings 
by encouraging a more efficient use of cash. García Lara, Osma, and Penalva (2016) find that more 
conservative firms are less likely to over-invest or under-invest. More specifically, they argue that 
conservatism, by forcing timely recognition of losses, alleviates under-investment by facilitating 
access to additional debt for new investments, and alleviates over-investment by enabling better 
project selection and earlier abandonment of loss-making projects.  
Ahmed and Duellman (2013) hypothesize that because overconfident managers tend to 
overestimate future returns from their investments and underestimate the negative impacts on firms’ 
cash flows, managerial overconfidence results in delayed loss recognition (i.e., less conditional 
conservatism). As predicted, they find that managerial overconfidence is negatively associated 
with conservatism, confirming the link between conservatism and investment efficiency. 
 
3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Among various measures of financial reporting qualities, we believe that the aspect of 
conservatism can capture a first-order effect of reporting quality on investment efficiency. We 
expect that conservatism improves labor investment efficiency through four channels: (1) reducing 
information asymmetry between managers and capital providers; (2) providing a disincentive to 
engage in inefficient investments through early warning signals about the profitability of projects 
undertaken; (3) reducing managerial overconfidence; and (4) promoting a long-term orientation in 
managerial investment decisions. 
First, conservatism is known to reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
capital providers (both debt and equity financing) as bad news will be reflected sooner under more 
conservative reporting. Labor inputs require capital outlay, which involves financing. Information 
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asymmetry exists between managers and capital providers since outsiders have less resources in 
knowing the optimal level of labor for a firm. This information asymmetry might result in 
inefficient resource allocation. For example, managers may prefer no layoffs or wage cuts when 
the operating performance is less satisfactory to enjoy a quiet life and maintain a good relationship 
with the workforce. Their preference for a certain set of labor policies can be implemented if it 
goes unnoticed. However, under conservative reporting, bad news will be reflected in earnings 
sooner and cannot be concealed for long. It will thus be more difficult for managers to justify their 
reluctance to lay off workers when performance suffers, implying that labor investment efficiency 
will be improved under conservative reporting. Along the same line, conservatism could facilitate 
debt and equity financing through its role in reducing information asymmetry. This ease of access 
to external financing helps firms to hire workers as needed.  
Second, conservatism helps provide early warning signals of the project outcome. Watts 
(2003a) suggests that conservatism allows directors and shareholders to receive early signals about 
the profitability of projects undertaken. In case of negative NPV projects, such signals could enable 
managers to intervene in a timely manner and take corrective actions, such as the abandonment of 
projects or the replacement of managers. Therefore, conservatism provides incentives 
(disincentives) for ex ante efficient (inefficient) investment decisions and facilitates ex post 
monitoring of investment decisions. These incentives would help managers adjust their labor 
investment in a timely manner.  
Third, the requirement of timely recognition of losses will reduce managerial 
overconfidence and discourage managers from producing sales estimates that are not overly 
optimistic, which serves as a basis for hiring or firing decisions. Since labor costs are mostly 
variable, labor budgets are usually based on sales forecasts. Therefore, in order to hire the 
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appropriate amount of workforce for a given project, managers should be able to foresee the 
expected sales. Since overestimating future performance and returns from a firm’s investments 
may lead to over-hiring or under-firing, conservatism can promote labor investment efficiency by 
mitigating the overestimation on sales potential.  
Fourth, conservatism can promote a long-term orientation on investment decisions. Self-
interested managers may pursue projects that do not generate positive net present value (NPV) but 
can bring in short-term benefits that help maintain or boost stock price. Conservatism can mitigate 
managerial myopia since it provides disincentives to managers to engage in such projects by 
accelerating the recognition of losses. Ball and Shivakumar (2006) argue that, because of 
conservatism, losses from poorly performing projects tend to be recognized early during a 
manager’s tenure; therefore, managers are deterred from making a value-destroying investment 
whose results will be revealed during his or her tenure. In other words, conservatism could 
potentially promote a long-term orientation on investment decisions since managers of 
conservative firms are less likely to engage in such investments when reporting losses which are 
inevitable in a short-term orientation. The long-term orientation is relevant for labor investment 
because the benefits of labor investments are more visible in a longer term. A short-term-oriented 
firm can end up under-investing in labor in fear of such investments reducing current earnings and 
adversely affecting stock prices (Porter 1992; Bushee 1998). Also, short-term-oriented firms may 
over-invest in labor or retain labor that are not needed with the expectation that they can fool the 
market and investors at least for a short term. Therefore, conservative firms tend to make more 
efficient labor investments due to their long-term orientation.  
Following the above arguments, we hypothesize that conservatism, by imposing timely 
recognition of losses, would act as a disciplining mechanism to prevent or deter inefficient 
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investments. This would result in the level of labor investment that is close to the one justified by 
a firm’s economic fundamentals - that is, a more efficient labor investment.  
Our hypothesis is summarized as follows: 
Hypothesis: Conservatism is negatively associated with inefficient investments in labor. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Measure of Labor Investment Inefficiency 
To measure labor investment inefficiency, we first estimate the expected level of net hiring 
(the percentage change in the number of employees) using the following model (1) according to 
Pinnuck and Lillis (2007). The absolute value of the residual from this model, ε, represents the 
abnormal net hire (AbsAbNetHire) and is used as our primary measure of labor investment 
inefficiency.  
NetHirei,t=β0+β1SGi,t-1+β2SGi,t+β3ΔROAi,t+β4ΔROAi,t-1+β5ROAi,t+β6Reti,t+β7Sizei,t-1+ 
β8Quicki,t-1+β9ΔQuicki,t+β10Levi,t-1+β11Lossbin1i,t-1+β12Lossbin2i,t-1+β13Lossbin3i,t-1+ 
β14Lossbin4i,t-1+β15Lossbin5i,t-1+εi,t                                                                      (1) 
 
Where NetHire is the percentage change in the number of employees; SG is the percentage change 
in sales; ROA is the net income divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; Ret is the 
annual buy and hold stock return; Size is the log of market value of equity at the beginning of the 
fiscal year; Quick is the ratio of cash and short-term investments plus receivables to current 
liabilities; Lev is the ratio of long term debt to total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year; 
Lossbin variables (Lossbin1 through Lossbin5) are dummy variables for each 0.005 interval of 
prior year ROA from 0 to -0.025 (for example, Lossbin1 equals one if prior year ROA is between 
-0.005 and 0, Lossbin2 equals one if prior year ROA is between zero and 0.005, and so on). The 
model also includes industry and fixed effects and is estimated annually.  
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4.2. Measure of Conservatism 
We construct a firm-specific measure of conservatism, Cscore, following the approach of 
Khan and watts (2009) based on Banker, Basu, Byzalov, and Chen (2016) model, which is the 
modified version of Basu’s (1997) piecewise linear regression model that parses out the effect of 
cost stickiness.  
 The original Basu (1997) model is as follows:  
NIt=β0+β1Dt+β2Rt+β3Dt*Rt+εt                                   (2) 
where NIt is net income before extraordinary items divided by market value of equity at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Rt is 12-month compound returns ending three months after the end 
of the fiscal year to remove the market response to the previous year’s earnings from the current 
economic news. Dt is an indicator variable and equals one if Rt is negative, and zero otherwise. A 
positive β3 implies greater conservatism, meaning losses are recognized more quickly than gains.  
Banker, Basu, Byzalov, and Chen (2016) modified the original Basu’s (1997) regression 
model to parse out the effect of cost stickiness, the phenomenon where costs rise more in response 
to sales increases than they fall for sales decreases. Without controlling for the asymmetric 
response of costs to sales increases versus decreases, Basu’s (1997) piecewise linear regression 
may erroneously detect reporting conservatism when it actually implies cost stickiness. 
Specifically, Banker, Basu, Byzalov, and Chen (2016) proposed the following model:  
NIt=α0+α1Dt+α2Rt+α3Dt*Rt+β1DSt+β2ΔSt/Pt-1+β3DSt*ΔSt/Pt-1 +εt                               (3) 
Where DSt is a dummy variable that equals one if sales decreased from year t-1 to t and zero 
otherwise, ΔSt/Pt-1 is the sales change from year t-1 to t that is scaled by the market value of equity 
at the beginning of the year, and the other variables are as defined previously.  
13 
 
We adopt the approach of Khan and Watts (2009) to develop a firm-level measure of 
conservatism (Cscore) by estimating the following annual cross sectional regression model:  
NIt=β0+β1Dt+Rt (µ1+µ2Sizet+µ3MtBt+µ4Levt)+DtRt(λ1+λ2Sizet+λ3MtBt+λ4Lev)+λ1+ 
(δ1Sizet+δ2MtBt+δ3 Levt+δ4 DtSizet+δ5Dt*MtBt+δ6DtLevt )+DSt(γ1+γ2 Size-
t+γ3MtBt+γ4Levt )+ΔSt/Pt-1(γ5+γ6Sizet+γ7MtBt+γ8Levt )+DSt*ΔSt/Pt-1(γ9+γ10Size-
t+γ11MtBt+γ12Levt )+εt                                                                                     (4) 
 
where all variables are as defined previously. Empirical estimators of λ1–λ4 are constant across 
firms, but vary each year since these estimates are derived from annual cross-sectional regressions. 
The modified Cscore equals λ1+λ2Sizet+λ3MtBt+λ4Levt. In other words, the incremental timeliness 
of annual bad news are linear functions of firm-specific characteristics. Our modified version of 
Cscore controls for the variation in cost stickiness and takes out this variation from the firm-level 
Cscore from Khan and Watts (2009) derived from the original Basu (1997) regression. 
4.3. Empirical Model  
We adopt the investment model used by Jung, Lee and Weber (2014) who investigate the 
link between financial reporting quality and labor investment. We use year fixed effects to control 
for possible macroeconomic factors and industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level to control 
for industry-wide factors affecting hiring decisions. Industry is defined according to the Fama-
French 48 industry classifications (Fama and French 1997). Specifically, we use the following 
model to test our hypothesis. 
AbsAbNetHirei,t=β0+β1Cscorei,t-1+β2FRQi,t-1+β3MtBi,t-1+β4Sizei,t-1+β5Quicki,t-1+ 
β6Leveragei,t-1+β7Dividendi,t-1+β8stdCFOi,t-1+β9stdSalesi,t-1+β10Tangiblei,t-1+β11Lossi,t-
1+β12Instii,t-1+β13stdNetHirei,t-1+β14LaborIntensityi,t-1+β15Unioni,t-1+β16AbInvesti,t+ 
εi,t                                                                                                                                                                                                (5)                       
 
Financial reporting quality is first controlled to tease out the effect of financial reporting 
quality on labor investment efficiency documented by Jung, Lee and Weber (2014). The composite 
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measure of financial reporting quality (FRQ) is constructed using three financial reporting quality 
variables (DisAcc, DisWCA and DisRev). Accrual quality can alleviate information frictions and 
restrain managers’ inefficient investment behaviors. We employ the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (DisAcc) (Jones 1991), discretionary working capital accruals (DisWCA), 
and discretionary revenues (DisRev) (Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang 2011). Details on calculating 
these three measures are discussed in Appendix B. Other control variables include growth 
opportunities (MtB), firm size (Size), liquidity (Quick), leverage (Leverage), dividend payout 
(Dividend), cash flow volatilities (StdCFO), sales volatilities (StdSales), tangibility (Tangible) and 
loss (Loss). We also include institutional ownership (Insti) to control for the ability of external 
monitoring mechanisms to mitigate market frictions by reducing information asymmetry between 
managers and investors. Firms’ net hiring volatility (StdNetHire), labor intensity (LaborIntensity) 
and industry-level unionization rates (Union) are further included to control for the amount of 
flexibility managers can exercise in hiring decisions. To capture unexpected net hiring originating 
from other investment decisions, such as capital expenditures and R&D expenditures, abnormal 
other investment (AbInvest) is controlled. AbInvest is measured based on the investment 
expectation model as in Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009), where the sum of capital expenditures, 
acquisition expenditures, and R&D expenditures, less cash from the sale of property, plant, and 
equipment, scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year, is regressed on lagged sales growth 
expressed in the percentage.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Sample  
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We have obtained financial statement data from Compustat and stock return data from 
CSRP. Institutional shareholding data were obtained from Thomson Reuters’ CDA/Spectrum 
database, and industry unionization data were obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage 
database.2 To calculate the financial reporting quality measures (DisAcc, DisWCA, DisRev) based 
on cash flow statement data, our sample period starts from year 1986 when cash flow data became 
available in Compustat. We require firms to have positive assets and sales. Financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are excluded due to the different nature of 
financial reporting and investments of these firms. Our sample consists of all firm-year 
observations from 1986 to 2014 with the necessary information in COMPUSTAT and CRSP to 
estimate all variables, yielding 31,865 firm-years representing 4,971 firms. To mitigate the 
influence of outliers, we winsorize all continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels. The sample 
size is reduced when the test requires corporate governance or managerial ability scores (as 
discussed in section 5.3.2.).   
5.2. Empirical Results 
5.2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 1 Panel A reports the industry distribution of firm-year observations for the top-five 
industries in the sample. The top-five industries represented are Business Services (12.5%), Chips 
(8.9%), Wholesale (6.3%), Computers (6.2%), and Machinery (5.3%). Descriptive statistics are 
provided in Panel B. The mean and median values of our primary variable, AbsAbNetHire, are 
                         
2
 The Union Membership and Coverage Database,available at www.unionstats.com, is an Internet data resource 
providing private and public sector labor union membership, coverage, and density estimates compiled from the 
monthly household Current Population Survey (CPS) using BLS methods. Economy-wide estimates are provided 
beginning in 1973; estimates by state, detailed industry, and detailed occupation begin in 1983; and estimates by 
metropolitan area begin in 1986. The Database, constructed by Barry Hirsch (Andrew Young School of Policy 
Studies, Georgia State University) and David Macpherson (Department of Economics, Trinity University), was 
created in 2002 and is updated annually (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003).  
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0.164 and 0.105, respectively. Correlations are provided in Panel C. Consistent with our hypothesis, 
AbsAbNetHire is negatively correlated with Cscore, providing initial evidence that conservatism 
is negatively associated with inefficient investments in labor. Correlations among other variables 
are generally consistent with prior research. For example, similar with Jung, Lee and Weber (2014), 
AbsAbNetHire is positively correlated with stdCFO, stdSales, and stdNetHire.  
5.2.2. Primary Results 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 The primary results of estimating model (5) on the entire sample are reported in Table 2 
column (1). The estimated coefficient on Cscore is negative and significant (coeff.=-0.039, p-
value<0.01), suggesting that conservatism is negatively associated with inefficient investments in 
labor and thus facilitates more efficient net hiring practices. A coefficient of -0.039 on Cscore 
means that each unit increase in Cscore leads to an incremental reduction in abnormal net hire. As 
shown in Table 1 Panel B, the mean of absabNetHire is 0.164. Therefore, a reduction in abnormal 
net hire for a unit increase in Cscore represents a 23% further reduction in abnormal net hiring, 
which is economically significant. This result supports the argument that conservatism mitigates 
labor investment. 
Consistent with Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009) and Jung, Lee and Weber (2014), the 
estimated coefficient on FRQ is negative and significant, suggesting that investment inefficiency 
in labor can be mitigated by high-quality financial reporting, but it is of a smaller magnitude than 
that on Cscore. For example, the coefficient on FRQ, -0.011, in the Column(1) translates into 7 % 
reduction in abnormal net hiring for a unit increase in FRQ, which represents only a third of the 
impact of Cscore (23%). As mentioned earlier, this confirms our belief that conservatism may be 
a primary force driving the improvement in investment efficiency in labor through its direct 
disciplinary mechanisms that induce management to act in the best interests of shareholders.  
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Consistent with Jung, Lee and Weber (2014), most control variables are significantly 
associated with inefficient investments in labor. Specifically, firms with lower financial reporting 
quality (FRQ), smaller size (Size), higher leverage (Leverage), more liquidity (Quick), no dividend 
payout (Dividend), lower profitability (Loss), and lower institutional ownership (Insti) tend to have 
less efficient investments in labor. Consistent with the correlation results, AbsAbNetHire is 
positively associated with stdCFO, stdSales, and stdNetHire, suggesting that greater deviations 
from the expected level of net hiring is associated with greater volatilities of cash flows, sales, and 
net hiring practices. 
 We further examine the association between conservatism and inefficient investment in 
labor on the over-investment (where the actual net hiring is greater than the expected level) and 
under-investment (where the actual net hiring is less than the expected level) subsamples and 
report the results in columns (2) and (3), respectively. The estimated coefficients on Cscore are 
negative and significant for the over-investment subsample (coeff.=-0.042, p-value<0.01) and for 
the under-investment subsample (coeff.=-0.040, p-value<0.01). A reduction in abnormal net hire 
for unit increase in Cscore for the overinvestment(underinvestment) subsample represents a 25% 
(24%) further reduction in abnormal net hiring, which is economically significant. These results 
support the argument that conservatism mitigates both over-investment and under-investment in 
labor.  
5.3. Robustness Analyses 
5.3.1. Subsamples of Over-hiring, Under-firing, Under-hiring and Over-firing  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Following Jung, Lee and Weber (2014), we decompose over- and under- investment in 
labor into the following four subsamples based on the signs of the abnormal net hiring and the 
expected level of net hiring.  
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 Positive AbNetHire Negative AbNetHire 
Positive Expected NetHire Over-hiring  
(Over-investment) 
Under-hiring  
(Under-investment) 
Negative Expected NetHire Under-firing  
(Over-investment) 
Over-firing  
(Under-investment) 
 
We then estimate model (5) on each specific subsample and report the results in Table 3. Over-
investment in labor could manifest managers’ empire-building agendas since self-interested 
managers engage in over-hiring activities to expand the staff or employees beyond the optimal size 
to gain more security, status and perceived professional achievement (Williamson 1963). Given 
that conservatism discourages empire-building agendas by constraining inefficient investments, 
more conservative firms will exhibit less over-hiring or under-firing labor practices. Alternatively, 
conservatism can reduce under-hiring and over-firing because it can alleviate financing frictions 
by reducing information asymmetry and reducing adverse selection problems for potential 
financing providers. Garcia Lara, Osma, and Penalva (2016) predict that conservatism mitigates 
underinvestment among firms facing financing difficulties and find consistent results. As 
conservatism facilitates financing for firms prone to underinvest, the likelihood of 
underinvestment in labor (under-hiring and over-firing) would be curtailed. The estimated 
coefficients on Cscore are negative and significant, indicating that the negative association 
between conservatism and inefficient investments in labor holds in all four scenarios – over-hiring, 
under-firing, under-hiring and over-firing. 
5.3.2. Two Alternative Proxies of Conservatism 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
We use two alternative proxies of conservatism. The first one is the accruals-cash flows-
based measure of conservatism, ACscore, based on Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Similar to the 
19 
 
main measure of conservatism, we also apply Khan and Watts’s (2009) method to estimate a firm-
year measure of conservatism by estimating the following regression model. 
ACCt=β0+β1DCt +CFOt(µ1+µ2Sizet+µ3MtBt+µ4Leveraget)+DCt*CFOt (λ1+λ2Sizet+λ 
3MtBt+λ4Leveraget )+(δ1Sizet+δ2MtBt+δ3 Leveraget+δ4 DCt*Sizet+δ5DCt*MtBt+ 
δ6DCt*Leveraget )+εt  
 
Where ACCt is total accruals in year t, deflated by the year t-1 market value of equity; CFOt is the 
cash flow from operations (OANCF) in year t deflated by the year t-1 market value of equity 
(CSHO*PRCC_F), and DCt is a dummy variable and equals one if CFOt is negative, and zero 
otherwise. Following Khan and Watts (2009), the timeliness of bad news (ACscore) can be 
expressed as follows:  
ACscore=β3=λ1+λ2Sizet+λ3MtBt+λ4Leveraget  
The other alternative conservatism proxy is the three-year accumulation of non-operating 
accruals (NOAs), based on Givoly and Hayn (2000). NOAs can be expressed as follows: 
NOA=(Net Income+Depreciation)–(ΔAccounts Receivable +ΔInventories +ΔPrepaid 
Expenses -ΔAccounts Payable -ΔTaxes Payable) 
 
NOAs are deflated by average total assets (AT), averaged over a 3-year period, and then multiplied 
by negative one. As presented in Table 4, our primary results hold for both alternative proxies, 
ACscore (coeff.=-0.016, p-value<0.01) and NOAs (coeff.=-0.022, p-value<0.01), corroborating the 
main results.  
5.3.3. Alternative Proxies of Labor Investment Efficiency  
We also use two alternative proxies of labor investment efficiency. Following Jung, Lee 
and Weber (2014), we use the average of a firm’s net hiring over the previous three years, and the 
industry-median net hiring as expected net hiring to calculate abnormal net hiring. In the 
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untabulated results using both alternative proxies, the coefficient on Cscore continues to be 
negative and significant, corroborating our primary results. 
5.3.4. Controlling for Managerial Ability and Corporate Governance 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 We further control for managerial ability and corporate governance to tease out the effects 
of managerial ability and corporate governance on conservatism. To proxy for managerial ability, 
we use the measure, MAscore, developed by Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and Mcvay (2013). To proxy 
for corporate governance, we use G-index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). As reported in 
Table 5, our primary result on the negative association between conservatism and inefficient 
investments in labor still holds after controlling for managerial ability (coeff.=-0.038, p-value<0.01) 
and corporate governance (coeff.=-0.029, p-value<0.01), confirming that the monitoring effect of 
conservatism on labor investment efficiency is above and beyond that of managerial ability or 
corporate governance.  
5.3.5. Controlling for Other Investments 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Prior studies document that a firm’s financial reporting quality relates to its investment 
behavior (Biddle and Hilary 2006; Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 2009). For example, Biddle, Hilary, 
and Verdi (2009) suggest that higher financial reporting quality can curb managerial incentives to 
engage in value destroying over-investments by disciplining them. They also argue that high 
financial reporting quality can alleviate the under-investment problem by allowing constrained 
firms to attract capital by making their positive net present value (NPV) projects more visible to 
investors and by reducing adverse selection in stock issuance. Labor is a major production input, 
and thus labor investment is likely to be positively related to other types of investments (such as 
capital or R&D expenditures). To the extent that labor investment is a simple manifestation of 
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other types of investments, one may argue that the results documented in this study are not 
distinguishable from the results documented previously. To address this concern, we conduct a 
similar test as in Jung, Lee and Weber (2014). The entire sample is divided into two subsamples 
when net hiring is positively or negatively associated with the change in total investment. If our 
results are simply driven by other investments, we will find the negative association between 
conservatism and abnormal net hiring only in the subsample with net hiring positively associated 
with a change in total investment (that is net hiring is moving in the same direction as total 
investment). The results documented in Table 6 show that our results hold for both subsamples, 
suggesting that the primary results are not simply driven by other investments and thus provide 
supplementary evidence to our primary results. 
5.3.6. Examining SAB No. 101 as an Exogenous Shock of Conservatism 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
The enactment of Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No.101 in 1999 results in the change 
in the regulatory regime. According to Crawford, Price, and Rountree (2011), accounting 
conservatism increases during the post-SAB 101 period. Therefore, we use the SAB No.101 as an 
exogenous shock to increase accounting conservatism to further test the association between 
conservatism and labor investment inefficiency. Cscore is replaced with an indicator variable SAB, 
that equals one after the enactment of SAB 101 and zero otherwise. Consistent with SAB 101 
increasing conservatism, the correlation between Cscore and SAB is positive and significant 
(coeff.=0.120) in our sample. To capture within-firm variation in labor efficiency around the 
enactment of SAB 101, we drop the year dummies and keep the firm fixed effects for this analysis. 
As reported in Table 7, SAB is negatively and significantly associated with AbsAbNetHire (coeff.=-
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0.008, p-value<0.01), confirming that a positive shock to accounting conservatism causes firms to 
reduce labor inefficiency. 
5.3.7. Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
As a further robustness check, we adopt the propensity-score matching method to more 
effectively control for the differences in relevant dimensions between the conservative and non-
conservative subsamples (Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 2010). Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 
(2010) argues that the propensity score matching method should be applied when the hypothesized 
causal variable is an endogenous choice by managers, boards of directors, or other similar parties. 
Because financial reporting decisions are less likely to be random, we attempt to control for 
potential selection bias using the propensity-score matching method. If differences in the outcome 
variable (investment behavior on labor market) between conservative firms and non-conservative 
firms are due to observable reasons other than conservatism, we expect that the coefficient on 
Cscore will not be different from zero in a matched sample. Instead, if conservatism does play a 
role in determining investment behavior on the labor market, then more conservative firms and 
their matches should exhibit different investment behavior on the labor market. 
In the first stage, we include all control variables in the following regression model (6) and 
estimate the model annually: 
Cscore_D=β0+β1FRQi,t-1+β2MtBi,t-1+β3Sizei,t-1+β4Quicki,t-1+β5Levi,t-1+β6Dividendi,t-1+ 
                  β7stdCFOi,t-1+β8stdSalesi,t-1+β9Tangiblei,t-1+β10Lossi,t-1+β11Instii,t-1+ 
                 β12stdNetHirei,t-1+β13LaborIntensityi,t-1+β14Unioni,t1+β15AbInvesti,t+ 
            β16MAScorei,t+εi,t                                                                                                  (6)  
 
Where Cscore_D equals one if a firm’s Cscore is above the industry-year median and zero 
otherwise. All other variables are as defined in model (5). We obtain the propensity score for each 
firm-year as the predicted value in model (6). We then match each treatment firm (conservative 
firm) with a control firm (non-conservative firm) that has the closest score in the same year within 
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a distance of 0.10 (without replacement) from the treatment firm’s propensity score. If the 
propensity score match is successful, then we assume that each conservative firm and its matching 
control firm are similar on all observable dimensions except for the extent of conservatism.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Table 8 Panel A reports the first stage results estimating model (6), suggesting that most 
of the firms’ characteristics are significantly related to conservatism. Panel B reports the second 
stage results comparing the labor investment inefficiency. The coefficient on Cscore, β1, is 
negative and significant (coeff.=-0.016, p-value<0.01), consistent with labor investment 
inefficiency is negatively related to conservatism. These results provide corroborating evidence 
for the primary results discussed in section 5.2.2.  
5.4. Additional Analyses 
5.4.1. Abnormal Net Hiring and Future Firm Performance 
Following Jung, Lee and Weber (2014), we run the following model which controls for the 
expected change in profitability that is unrelated to labor inefficiency as well as conservatism.   
ΔROAiavg(t+1,t+2,t+3)=β0+β1AbsNetHireit+β2Cscore it+β3AbsNetHireit*Cscoreit+(γ1+γ2 
NetDFEit+γ3NegDFEit*DFEit+γ4PosDFEit*DFEit)*DFEit +(λ1+λ2NegCEit+λ3NegCEit*CEit+ 
λ4PosCEit*CEit)*CEit+εit                                                                                                                                    (7) 
 
Where DFE is defined as the difference between ROA and expected ROA. Expected ROA is the 
fitted value from a cross-sectional regression of ROA on the natural logarithm of total assets (ATt-
1), the natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of equity (MTBit-1), ROAit-1 and industry 
dummies. CE is the change in ROA from year t-1 to t. PosDFE (NegDFE) is a dummy variable 
that equals one (zero) for positive (negative) DFE. Similarly, PosCE (NegCE) is a dummy variable 
that equals one (zero) for positive (negative) CE. The dependent variable is either one-year-ahead 
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of the changes in ROA or the average change over the next three years (Chang, Kumar, and 
Sivaramakrishnan 2006; Jennings, Jung, and Yang 2012). 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
As shown in Table 9 column 1 (using the one-year-ahead change in ROA), the coefficient 
on AbsAbNetHire is negative (coeff.=-0.062, p-value<0.01), indicating that labor inefficiencies 
reduce future profitability. The coefficient on AbsAbNetHire*Cscore is positive (coeff.=0.190, p-
value<0.01), indicating conservatism mitigates the negative impact of labor inefficiencies on 
future profitability. The same results hold for the average changes in ROA over the next three years. 
Overall, these results suggest that suboptimal net hiring is costly in terms of future performance 
and lend some additional support to using abnormal net hiring as the primary measure of labor 
investment inefficiency. 
5.4.2. High vs. Low Unionized Subsamples 
Labor unions have reason to demand high financial reporting quality and more 
transparent financial reports since they rely on financial information in collective bargaining 
negotiations. However, organized labor creates incentives for managers to increase information 
asymmetry in order to hold greater influence over the content of the financial information that 
unions receive. Thus, to the extent that firms in highly unionized industries are characterized by 
higher levels of information asymmetry, we may expect that accounting conservatism may play a 
larger role in mitigating information asymmetry, thus leading to an incremental reduction in labor 
investment inefficiency.  
[Insert Table 10 Here] 
In Table 10, we present the results of estimating model (5) separately for the high and low 
unionization subsamples, which is based on whether unionization rates for a given industry are 
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above or below the median of that year. For brevity, for each subsample, we tabulate only the 
results for Cscore, along with tests of equivalence across subsamples. In column (1), the coefficient 
on Cscore is negative and significant for all sample firms. The difference in the coefficients 
between high vs. low unionized subsamples is not significant (F-stat=-1.12, p-value=0.261). When 
the subsample is divided into firms having positive expected net hiring (in column 2) and negative 
expected net hiring (in column 3), a negative coefficient on Cscore is only found in the subsample 
with positive expected net hiring (in column 2). Overall, the results indicate that the monitoring 
benefit of conservatism in labor investment efficiency is equally valuable regardless of the degree 
of the unionized workforce, but is concentrated in firms with positive economic fundamentals. The 
fact that there is no significant difference between high and low unionized subsamples (or 
equivalently, high and low information asymmetry subsamples) may imply that the underlying 
channel through which conservatism reduces investment inefficiency in labor may be its ability to 
incentivize managers to act more in line with shareholders’ interests, rather than its ability to 
reduce information asymmetry. 
5.4.3. Considering Labor Adjustment Costs 
The effectiveness of conservatism in increasing labor investment efficiency may vary 
across the extent of a firm’s reliance on skilled labor. Similar to capital expenditures, labor costs 
associated with recruiting, training, and firing are significant and variable in nature, and thus, are 
subject to adjustment costs (Oi 1962; Farmer 1985; Hamermesh 1993). Because these costs for 
high skilled labor are higher than those for the low skilled labor (Ochoa 2013), we expect that 
conservatism may play a more prominent role in improving labor investment efficiency for firms 
that require highly skilled labor.   
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Following Ochoa (2013), we use Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Department of Labor’s O*NET program classification of 
occupations according to job skill level, to construct an industry-specific reliance on skilled labor. 
We divide the sample into the high (above-median) skilled labor and the low (below-median) 
skilled labor subgroups, where industry is defined using the 3-digit NAICS code. 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
Table 11 shows the results testing how the effectiveness of conservatism in improving 
investment efficiency varies with the extent of a firm’s reliance on skilled labor. While the 
coefficients on Cscore are significantly negative for both subgroups, the absolute magnitude of the 
coefficient on Cscore for the high skilled labor subgroup (coeff.=-0.071) is about three times larger 
and more statistically significant (p-value<0.01) than that of the low skilled labor subgroup 
(coeff.=-0.024, p-value<0.1). Also, the difference in the coefficients on Cscore between two 
subgroups is statistically significant at the 10% level. The results are consistent with the prediction 
that the benefit of conservatism in improving labor investment efficiency increases as labor 
adjustment costs become greater. These results strengthen the link between conservatism and labor 
investment efficiency. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Prior literature in accounting posits that conservatism can mitigate investment inefficiency 
in the capital markets. We extend this line of research by examining the effect of conservatism on 
investment efficiency in the labor market, an important area that has been overlooked. We find 
that conservatism mitigates investment inefficiency, both over-investment and under-investment 
in labor. This negative association between conservatism and investment inefficiency in labor 
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holds in all possible scenarios of inefficient investment, including over-hiring, under-firing, under-
hiring, and over-firing in the labor market and also holds after controlling for managerial ability, 
corporate governance and other investments. Also, the results are both statistically and 
economically significant. Overall, our results contribute to a growing body of evidence suggesting 
that financial reporting practices, specifically, conservatism, improves firms’ investment decisions 
in general and in labor in particular. 
Our study has several limitations. First, while we find that conservatism is associated with 
a greater improvement in labor investment efficiency, we note that our study is not designed to 
identify the underlying mechanism through which conservatism affects labor investment. Second, 
although we try to address the endogeneity in conservatism using the SAB No.101 as an exogenous 
shock to increase accounting conservatism, the association between conservatism and labor 
investment decisions may be driven by some underlying firm characteristics that we do not 
adequately control for in our empirical specifications. Third, although we use various measures of 
conditional conservatism and alternative tests to triangulate our results, our inferences ultimately 
depend on how well the conservatism proxies capture the underlying construct of conservative 
reporting. Fourth, our results are specific to the United States and may not carry over to other 
countries with different labor markets. 
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Appendix A: Variable Measurement 
Dependent Variables: 
NetHire =the percentage change in employees.  
AbNetHire =the residual from model (1). 
 
AbsAbNetHire =the absolute value of AbNetHire. 
Independent Variables: 
Cscore = λ1+λ2Sizet+λ3MtBt+λ4Leveraget , using the coefficients λ1-λ4 derived from 
the following cross-sectional regression model. 
NIt=β0+β1Dt+Rt (µ1+µ2Sizet+µ3MtBt+µ4Leveraget)+DtRt(λ1+λ2Sizet+ 
λ3MtBt+λ4Leverage)+λ1+(δ1Sizet+δ2MtBt+δ3 Leveraget+δ4 DtSizet+ 
δ5Dt*MtBt+δ6DtLeveraget )+DSt(γ1+γ2 Sizet+γ3MtBt+γ4Leveraget )+ 
ΔSt/Pt1(γ5+γ6Sizet+γ7MtBt+γ8Leveraget )+DSt*ΔSt/Pt-1(γ9+γ10Sizet+γ11MtBt+ 
γ12Leveraget )+εt          
Cscore_D =1 if Cscore is above the industry-year median, and 0 otherwise. 
ACscore = λ1+λ2Sizet+λ3MtBt+λ 4Leveraget, using the coefficients λ1- λ4 derived from 
the following cross-sectional model. 
 ACCt=β0+β1DCt +CFOt(µ1+µ2Sizet+µ3MtBt+µ4Leveraget)+DCt*CFOt 
(λ1+λ2Sizet+λ 3MtBt+λ4Leveraget )+(δ1Sizet+δ2MtBt+δ3 Leveraget+δ4 
DCt*Sizet+δ5DCt*MtBt+δ6DCt*Leveraget )+εt  
NOA =[(Net Income + Depreciation) – (ΔAccounts Receivable +ΔInventories 
+ΔPrepaid Expenses -ΔAccounts Payable -ΔTaxes Payable)]/average total 
assets, multiplied by negative one.  
SAB =1 after the enactment of SAB No. 101 and 0 otherwise. 
Other Variables: 
SG =the percentage change in sales. 
ROA =return on assets. 
Ret =the annual buy and hold stock returns.  
Size =the logarithm of market value of equity at the beginning of the year. 
Quick =the ratio of cash and short-term investments plus receivables to current 
liabilities.  
Leverage =the ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Lossbin1 =1 if prior year ROA is between -0.005 and 0 and 0 otherwise.  
Lossbin2 =1 if prior year ROA is between 0 and 0.005 and 0 otherwise.  
Lossbin3 =1 if prior year ROA is between 0.005 and 0.010 and 0 otherwise.  
Lossbin4 =1 if prior year ROA is between 0.010 and 0.015 and 0 otherwise.  
Lossbin5 =1 if prior year ROA is between 0.015 and 0.020 and 0 otherwise.  
NI =net income before extraordinary items divided by market value of equity at 
the beginning of the year. 
R =the 12-month compound returns ending 3 months after the end of the year. 
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D =1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise. 
S =sales revenue. 
DS =1 if sales decrease for the prior year to the current year and 0 otherwise. 
P =stock price at the ending of the year. 
MtBt =market to book ratio. 
FRQ =the aggregate measure of three financial reporting qualities variables 
(PerfDA, DisWCA, DisRev), summing the percentile ranks of these three 
variables, as described in Appendix B.   
Dividend =dividend payout ratio. 
stdCFO =standard deviation of cash flow of operations. 
stdSales =standard deviation of sales. 
Tangible =the ratio of PP&E to total assets. 
Loss =1 if ROA is negative, and 0 otherwise. 
Insti =institutional ownership ratio. 
stdNetHire =standard deviation of NetHire.  
LaborIntensity =the number of employees divided by total assets at the end of last year. 
Union =industry-level rate of labor unionization. 
AbInvest =abnormal other investment, measured based on the investment expectation 
model as in Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi (2009). 
MAscore =the managerial ability score as developed by Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and 
Mcvay (2013).  
G =G-index as in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
Industry =the 48 industries defined by Fama and French (1997). 
DFE =the difference between ROA and the expected ROA, which is the fitted value 
from a cross-sectional regression of ROA on the natural logarithm of total 
assets (ATt-1), the natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of equity 
(MTBit-1), ROAit-1 and industry dummies. 
PosDFE =1 if DFE is positive and 0 otherwise. 
NegDFE =1 if DFE is negative and 0 otherwise. 
CE =the change in ROA from year t-1 to t. 
PosCE =1 if CE is positive and 0 otherwise. 
NegCE =1 if CE is negative and 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix B: Measures of the Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) 
 
FRQ is an aggregate measure of the following three measures of financial reporting quality, 
summing the percentile ranks of these three variables. 
 
1. Discretionary accruals (DisAcc) (Jones, 1991). 
DisAcc is estimated cross-sectionally each year using all firm-years in the same two-digit 
SIC code. 
TA=α+β11/TotalAssetsi,t-1+β2(∆Revi,t-∆ARi,t)+β3PPEi,t+εi,t 
Where TA=total accruals=net income minus cash flow from operations, TotalAssets=total assets, 
∆Rev=change in revenues scaled by lagged total assets, ∆AR=change in accounts receivable scaled 
by lagged total assets, and PPE=gross value of PPE scaled by lagged total assets. Residuals from 
the above model are modified Jones-model discretionary accruals (Jones, 1991).  
 
2. Discretionary working capital accruals (DisWCA) (Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang, 2011)  
Dechow and Dichev (2002) develop a model for expected accruals and interpret the 
deviation from this expected value as the estimation error in accruals. This measure focuses on the 
strength of the relation between current accruals and past, present, and future cash flows. We use 
the Dechow-Dichev model as modified by McNichols (2002) and Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and 
Schipper (2005), adjusting for negative cash flows (Ball and Shivakumar 2006; Givoly and Hayn, 
2000). The following model is estimated for each industry-year with at least 20 observations: 
WCAi,t=a0+a1OCFi,t1+a2OCFi,t+a3OCFi,t+1+a4ΔRevi,t+a5PPEi,t+a6ΔOCFi,t+ 
a7OCFi,t*ΔOCFi,t+εi,t 
Where WCA=working capital accruals=the change in non-cash current assets minus the change 
in current liabilities other than short-term debt and taxes payable, scaled by lagged total assets; 
OCF=cash flow from operations=the sum of net income, depreciation, and amortization, minus 
WCA, all scaled by lagged total assets (Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang 2011); ΔRev=annual change in 
revenues scaled by lagged total assets; PPE=property, plant, and equipment, scaled by lagged total 
assets; and ΔOCF=an indicator variable for negative operating cash flows. The residuals εi,t 
represent the estimation errors in the current accruals that are not associated with operating cash 
flows and that cannot be explained by the change in revenue and the level of PPE. WCA is the 
absolute value of εi,t. 
 
3. Discretionary Revenue (DisRev) (Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang 2011) 
We use discretionary revenues based on McNichols and Stubben (2008) and Stubben 
(2010). We use the following regression for each industry-year with at least 20 observations: 
ΔARi,t=a0+a1ΔRevi,t+εi,t 
Where ΔAR=the annual change in accounts receivable and ΔRev=the annual change in revenues, 
each scaled by lagged total assets. DisRev are the residuals εi,t.   
 
All these three variables are multiplied by negative one so that greater values represent 
better quality of financial reporting and information environment.  
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TABLE 1 
Industry Distribution, Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
  
Panel A: Industry Distribution 
 
Industry 
Percentage of  
firm-years  
Business Services 12.5% 
Chips 8.9% 
Wholesale 6.3% 
Computers 6.2% 
Machinery 5.3% 
Firms from the Top-5 Industries 39.3% 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. 25th Median 75th 
AbsAbNetHiret 31,865 0.164 0.181 0.047 0.105 0.210 
Cscoret-1 31,865 0.117 0.150 0.050 0.117 0.194 
FRQt-1 31,865 -0.504 0.291 -0.667 -0.667 -0.333 
MtBt-1 31,865 1.840 1.470 1.085 1.431 2.081 
Size t-1 31,865 5.401 1.898 4.024 5.313 6.675 
Quickt-1 31,865 1.836 1.930 0.839 1.272 2.155 
Leveraget-1 31,865 0.189 0.225 0.004 0.127 0.292 
Dividendt-1 31,865 0.324 0.468 0.000 0.000 1.000 
stdCFOt-1 31,865 0.064 0.054 0.029 0.050 0.083 
stdSalest-1 31,865 0.310 0.319 0.107 0.206 0.391 
Tangiblet-1 31,865 0.573 0.444 0.256 0.466 0.772 
Losst-1 31,865 0.261 0.439 0.000 0.000 1.000 
stdNetHiret-1 31,865 0.194 0.191 0.068 0.135 0.249 
LaborIntensityt-1 31,865 0.011 0.041 0.003 0.006 0.011 
Uniont-1 31,865 0.050 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.056 
Instit-1 31,865 0.464 0.292 0.216 0.451 0.693 
abInvestt-1 31,865 -0.025 0.114 -0.102 -0.039 0.030 
MAscore 31,406 0.564 0.271 0.300 0.600 0.800 
Gscoret-1 15,617 -8.585 2.688 -10.000 -9.000 -7.000 
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Panel C: Pearson Correlation  
Variables 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 
1.AbsAbNetHire 0.05 -0.02 0.06 -0.11 0.27 0.04 -0.14 0.14 0.10 -0.02 0.11 0.13 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.04 0.02 0.07 
2.Cscoret-1  -0.03 -0.24 -0.59 -0.03 -0.02 -0.21 0.15 0.11 -0.06 0.20 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.41 -0.06 -0.06 0.09 
3.FRQt-1   0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.02 
4.MtBt-1    0.25 0.20 -0.15 -0.05 0.14 0.03 -0.09 -0.10 -0.04 -0.02 -0.09 0.17 0.11 0.24 0.08 
5.Size t-1     0.03 0.07 0.31 -0.21 -0.13 0.05 -0.17 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 0.64 0.06 0.03 -0.19 
6.Quickt-1      -0.19 -0.13 0.08 0.04 -0.22 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11 0.09 -0.03 0.11 0.14 
7.Leveraget-1       0.04 -0.17 -0.06 0.31 0.00 0.13 -0.04 0.11 0.04 0.19 -0.21 -0.04 
8.Dividendt-1        -0.25 -0.18 0.19 -0.20 -0.18 0.01 0.18 0.12 -0.05 0.01 -0.24 
9.stdCFOt-1         0.35 -0.16 0.17 0.14 -0.01 -0.10 -0.17 0.03 0.11 0.12 
10.stdSalest-1          -0.20 0.09 0.36 0.04 -0.06 -0.12 0.03 0.02 0.11 
11.Tangiblet-1           -0.08 -0.09 0.00 0.15 -0.01 0.19 -0.11 -0.11 
12.Losst-1            0.13 -0.02 -0.06 -0.15 -0.03 -0.10 0.03 
13.stdNetHiret-1             0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.09 
14.LaborIntensityt-1              0.00 -0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.00 
15.Uniont-1               -0.14 0.04 -0.03 0.00 
16.Instit-1                0.07 -0.03 -0.13 
17.abInvestt-1                 0.05 0.06 
18.MAscore                  0.03 
19.Gscoret-1                   
Panel A reports the distribution of firm-year observations and unique firms from the top-five industries. Industry is defined according to the Fama-French 48 
industry classification (Fama and French, 1997). Panel B shows the descriptive statistics of variables. Panel C shows the Pearson correlations among variables. 
Italic font denotes correlations that are statistically significant at p<0.05. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  
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TABLE 2 
The Effect of Conservatism on Labor Investment Efficiency 
 
The regression model: 
AbsAbNetHiret = β0+β1Cscoreit-1+β2FRQit-1+β3MtBit-1+β4Sizeit-1+β5Quickit-1+β6Leverageit-1+β7Dividendit-1+ 
β8stdCFOit-1+β9stdSalesit-1+β10Tangibleit-1+β11Lossit-1+β12Instiit-1+β13stdNetHireit-1+β14LaborIntensityit-1+ 
β15Unionit-1+β16AbInvestit+εit                                                                                                                                           (5) 
 
 
 
Variables 
(1) 
Dependent Variable = 
Abnormal Net Hiring 
(abNetHiring) 
(2) 
Overinvestment in 
Labor Subample 
(abNetHiring>0) 
(3) 
Underinvestment in 
Labor Subsample 
(abNetHiring<0) 
Coeff.  t-stat Coeff.  t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept 0.099 *** 6.01 0.129 *** 5.77 0.100 *** 4.32 
Cscore t-1 -0.039 *** -6.33 -0.042 *** -4.79 -0.040 *** -4.55 
FRQt-1 -0.011 *** -3.68 -0.004  -0.95 -0.017 *** -4.16 
MtB t-1 0.003 *** 3.00 0.006 *** 3.77 0.001  1.05 
Sizet-1 -0.012 *** -12.14 -0.013 *** -9.56 -0.012 *** -8.93 
Quickt-1 0.027 *** 34.74 0.009 *** 4.90 0.032 *** 30.44 
Leveraget-1 0.060 *** 9.63 0.018 * 1.95 0.079 *** 9.39 
Dividendt-1 -0.012 *** -5.56 -0.017 *** -4.97 -0.010 *** -3.80 
stdCFOt-1 0.213 *** 8.90 0.246 *** 6.63 0.185 *** 6.04 
stdSalest-1 0.010 ** 2.45 0.015 ** 2.32 0.007  1.48 
Tangiblet-1 -0.004  -1.27 -0.019 *** -3.83 0.004  0.80 
Losst-1 0.035 *** 14.47 0.011 *** 3.08 0.053 *** 16.59 
stdNetHiret-1 0.070 *** 10.74 0.070 *** 6.83 0.070 *** 8.53 
LaborIntensityt-1 0.016  0.55 -0.146 ** -2.41 0.049  1.44 
Uniont-1 -0.026 ** -2.25 0.013  0.72 -0.064 *** -4.34 
Instit-1 -0.023 *** -5.08 -0.015 ** -2.27 -0.029 *** -4.56 
abInvestt-1 0.072 *** 7.15 0.015  0.96 0.122 *** 9.44 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 24.03% 8.63% 36.68% 
N 31,865 14,424 17,441 
This table presents the results of estimating model (5). The results for the full sample, the overinvestment subsample 
(where the actual net hiring is greater than the expected level), and underinvestment subsample (where the actual net 
hiring is less than the expected level) are provided in columns (1), (2) and (3), respectively. All variables are as 
defined in Appendix A. p-values are based on two-tailed tests, with standard errors clustered by firm.  
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TABLE 3 
The Effect of Conservatism on Over- and Under- Hiring (and Firing) 
The regression model:  
AbsAbNetHiret = β0+β1Cscoreit-1+β2FRQit-1+β3MtBit-1+β4Sizeit-1+β5Quickit-1+β6Leverageit-1+β7Dividendit-1+β8stdCFOit-1+β9stdSalesit-1+β10Tangibleit-1+β11Lossit-
1+β12Instiit-1+β13stdNetHireit-1+β14LaborIntensityit-1+β15Unionit-1+β16AbInvestit+εit                                                                                                                                (5)                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
Variables 
(1) 
Overhiring 
(2) 
Underfiring 
(3) 
Underhiring 
(4) 
Overfiring 
Coeff.  t-stat Coeff.  t-stat Coeff.  t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept 0.050  1.06 0.107 *** 3.70 0.146 *** 5.30 0.103 *** 2.78 
Cscoret-1  -0.024 * -1.83 -0.043 *** -4.06 -0.050 *** -4.27 -0.027 ** -2.15 
FRQt-1 0.006  0.85 -0.025 *** -5.37 -0.008  -1.36 0.005  0.66 
MtB t-1 0.003  1.58 0.001  0.59 0.006 *** 2.66 0.008 *** 3.22 
Sizet-1 -0.009 *** -4.00 -0.013 *** -7.61 -0.015 *** -8.68 -0.008 *** -4.11 
Quickt-1 0.031 *** 30.35 0.033 *** 24.10 0.010 *** 4.92 0.004  1.22 
Leveraget-1 0.095 *** 9.23 0.073 *** 7.31 0.030 *** 2.65 -0.008  -0.51 
Dividendt-1 -0.010 * -1.77 -0.011 *** -3.25 -0.017 *** -3.76 -0.016 *** -3.17 
stdCFOt-1 0.217 *** 4.63 0.181 *** 5.06 0.219 *** 4.83 0.306 *** 4.83 
stdSalest-1 0.009  1.24 0.007  1.25 0.016 ** 2.00 0.014  1.29 
Tangiblet-1 0.01 ** 2.17 -0.000  -0.04 -0.025 *** -3.84 -0.005  -0.66 
Losst-1 0.047 *** 9.56 0.055 *** 14.24 0.008  1.58 0.019 *** 3.38 
stdNetHiret-1 0.041 *** 3.60 0.083 *** 8.10 0.076 *** 5.95 0.054 *** 3.22 
LaborIntensityt-1 0.050  0.94 0.049  1.23 -0.191 ** -2.47 -0.064  -0.54 
Uniont-1 -0.086 *** -2.99 -0.056 *** -3.17 0.036  1.38 -0.031  -1.20 
Instit-1 -0.038 *** -3.66 -0.027 *** -3.59 -0.017 * -1.90 -0.009  -1.07 
abInvestt-1 0.109 *** 5.21 0.126 *** 8.38 0.009  0.47 0.035  1.21 
Year Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 42.74% 34.55% 8.49% 9.63% 
N 4,742 12,699 9,745 4,679 
This table reports the results of estimating model (5) on four subsamples (overhiring, undefiring, underhiring and overhiring) of the sample. The four subsamples 
are defined as Jung et al. (2014). All variables are as defined in Appendix A. p-values are based on two-tailed tests, with standard errors clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 4 
Alternative Proxies of Conservatism 
The regression model: 
AbsAbNetHiret = β0+β1Cscoreit-1+β2FRQit-1+β3MtBit-1+β4Sizeit-1+β5Quickit-1+β6Leverageit-1+β7Dividendit-1+ 
β8stdCFOit-1+β9stdSalesit-1+β10Tangibleit-1+β11Lossit-1+β12Instiit-1+β13stdNetHireit-1+β14LaborIntensityit-1+ 
β15Unionit-1+β16AbInvestit+εit                                                                                                                                           (5) 
 
 Variables 
(1) 
Cscore = Acsore 
(2) 
Cscore = Negative NOA 
Coeff.  T-stat Coeff.  T-stat 
Intercept 0.057 *** 3.68 0.083 *** 3.74 
Cscore-1 -0.016 *** -2.97 -0.022 *** -2.78 
FRQt-1 -0.012 *** -4.00 -0.006  -1.28 
MtB t-1 0.005 *** 4.69 0.005 *** 3.30 
Sizet-1 -0.008 *** -10.83 -0.007 *** -6.94 
Quickt-1 0.027 *** 34.81 0.027 *** 25.79 
Leveraget-1 0.059 *** 9.13 0.051 *** 5.28 
Dividendt-1 -0.013 *** -6.00 -0.013 *** -3.75 
stdCFOt-1 0.209 *** 8.66 0.195 *** 5.81 
stdSalest-1 0.010 ** 2.50 0.013 ** 2.16 
Tangiblet-1 -0.004  -1.28 -0.002  -0.53 
Losst-1 0.034 *** 14.05 0.037 *** 10.14 
stdNetHiret-1 0.069 *** 10.50 0.071 *** 7.16 
LaborIntensityt-1 0.022  0.73 -0.012  -0.55 
Uniont-1 -0.031 *** -2.65 -0.042 ** -2.04 
Instit-1 -0.019 *** -4.15 -0.019 *** -2.85 
abInvestt-1 0.080 *** 7.85 0.001  0.12 
MAScoret-1 0.002  0.58 0.091 *** 6.31 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Adj R2 23.54% 22.62% 
N 31,425 16,434 
This table reports the results of estimating model (5) using two alternative proxies of conservatism, Acsore and 
Negative NOA. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. p-values are based on two-tailed tests, with standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 5 
Controlling for Managerial Ability and Corporate Governance 
The regression model: 
AbsAbNetHiret = β0+β1Cscoreit-1+β2FRQit-1+β3MtBit-1+β4Sizeit-1+β5Quickit-1+β6Leverageit-1+β7Dividendit-1+ 
β8stdCFOit-1+β9stdSalesit-1+β10Tangibleit-1+β11Lossit-1+β12Instiit-1+β13stdNetHireit-1+β14LaborIntensityit-1+ 
β15Unionit-1+β16abInvestit+β17MAscoreit+β18Gindexit+εit                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
Variables 
(1) 
Controlling for  
Managerial Ability 
 
 
Variables 
(2) 
Controlling for 
Managerial Ability and 
Corporate Governance 
Coeff.  t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept 0.097 *** 5.78 Intercept 0.100 *** 3.36 
Cscoret-1 -0.038 *** -6.14 Cscoret-1 -0.029 *** -3.49 
FRQt-1 -0.012 *** -3.80 FRQt-1 -0.008 ** -2.00 
MtB t-1 0.003 *** 2.94 MtBt-1 0.002  1.28 
Sizet-1 -0.012 *** -12.09 Sizet-1 -0.011 *** -8.26 
Quickt-1 0.027 *** 34.42 Quickt-1 0.026 *** 20.4 
Leveraget-1 0.060 *** 9.33 Levt-1 0.064 *** 6.93 
Dividendt-1 -0.012 *** -5.54 Dividendt-1 -0.008 *** -2.63 
stdCFOt-1 0.208 *** 8.64 stdCFOt-1 0.212 *** 5.10 
stdSalest-1 0.011 *** 2.61 stdSalest-1 0.011  1.64 
Tangiblet-1 -0.004  -1.14 Tangiblet-1 0.000  0.01 
Losst-1 0.036 *** 14.56 Losst-1 0.032 *** 8.69 
stdNetHiret-1 0.069 *** 10.56 stdNetHiret-1 0.072 *** 7.67 
LaborIntensityt-1 0.017  0.57 LaborIntensityt-1 -0.087 ** -2.45 
Uniont-1 -0.026 ** -2.23 Uniont-1 -0.025 * -1.69 
Instit-1 -0.023 *** -4.92 Instit-1 -0.012 * -1.95 
abInvestt-1 0.071 *** 7.00 abInvestt-1 0.053 *** 3.82 
MAscore 0.001  0.33 MAscore 0.010 ** 2.17 
    Gindex 0.000  0.76 
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
Adj. R2 24.11% Adj. R2 25.75% 
N 31,406 N 15,617 
This table presents the results of estimating model (5), controlling for managerial ability (MAscore) and corporate 
governance (Gindex). All variables are as defined in Appendix A. p-values are based on two-tailed tests, with 
standard errors clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 6  
Controlling for Other Investments 
The regression model: 
AbsAbNetHiret = β0+β1Cscoreit-1+β2FRQit-1+β3MtBit-1+β4Sizeit-1+β5Quickit-1+β6Leverageit-1+β7Dividendit-1+ 
β8stdCFOit-1+β9stdSalesit-1+β10Tangibleit-1+β11Lossit-1+β12Instiit-1+β13stdNetHireit-1+β14LaborIntensityit-1+ 
β15Unionit-1+β16AbInvestit+εit                                                                                                                                           (5) 
 
 
 
Variables 
(1) 
When NetHire is  
positively related to  
change in investment 
(2) 
When NetHire is 
negatively related to 
change in investment 
Coeff.  t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept 0.105 *** 4.09 0.090 *** 2.91 
Cscoret-1 -0.040 *** -5.38 -0.037 *** -4.30 
FRQt-1 -0.008 ** -1.99 -0.018 *** -3.71 
MtB t-1 0.004 *** 4.18 0.002 * 1.82 
Sizet-1 -0.012 *** -9.53 -0.011 *** -7.83 
Quickt-1 0.025 *** 35.73 0.028 *** 37.47 
Leveraget-1 0.074 *** 11.02 0.046 *** 7.12 
Dividendt-1 -0.015 *** -4.75 -0.009 ** -2.48 
stdCFOt-1 0.208 *** 7.88 0.222 *** 7.55 
stdSalest-1 0.010 ** 2.27 0.010 * 1.93 
Tangiblet-1 -0.003  -0.72 -0.007  -1.62 
Losst-1 0.031 *** 10.27 0.041 *** 12.01 
stdNetHiret-1 0.069 *** 9.69 0.071 *** 8.95 
LaborIntensityt-1 -0.010  -0.30 0.042  1.36 
Uniont-1 -0.039 ** -2.24 -0.017  -0.83 
Instit-1 -0.021 *** -3.50 -0.027 *** -4.18 
abInvestt-1 0.066 *** 5.27 0.091 *** 7.13 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 21.45% 27.63% 
N 18,274 12,484 
This table presents the results of estimating model (5) across the subsamples when NetHire is positively and 
negatively related to change in investment. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. p-values are based on two-
tailed tests, with standard errors clustered by firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
TABLE 7  
Examining SAB No. 101 as an Exogenous Shock of Conservatism 
The regression model: 
AbsAbNetHiret = β0+β1SABit-1+β2FRQit-1+β3MtBit-1+β4Sizeit-1+β5Quickit-1+β6Leverageit-1+β7Dividendit-1+ 
β8stdCFOit-1+β9stdSalesit-1+β10Tangibleit-1+β11Lossit-1+β12Instiit-1+β13stdNetHireit-1+β14LaborIntensityit-1+ 
β15Unionit-1+β16AbInvestit+εit                                                                                                                                           (5) 
 
Variables Coeff.  t-stat 
SAB -0.008 *** -2.71 
FRQt-1 -0.012 *** -3.71 
MtB t-1 0.006 *** 6.85 
Sizet-1 -0.006 *** -4.75 
Quickt-1 0.028 *** 35.86 
Leveraget-1 0.057 *** 8.56 
Dividendt-1 -0.001 
 
-0.20 
stdCFOt-1 0.055 ** 2.03 
stdSalest-1 0.015 *** 3.10 
Tangiblet-1 0.016 *** 3.68 
Losst-1 0.025 *** 10.11 
stdNetHiret-1 -0.050 *** -7.10 
LaborIntensityt-1 0.033 
 
0.76 
Uniont-1 -0.011 
 
-0.60 
Instit-1 -0.019 *** -2.94 
abInvestt-1 0.023 *** 4.79 
MAScoret-1 0.052 *** 5.08 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Adj. R2 43.02% 
N  31,865 
This table presents the results of using SAB No. 101 as an exogenous shock to increase accounting conservatism to 
further test the association between conservatism and labor investment inefficiency. In model (5), we replace Cscore 
with an indicator variable SAB, that equals one after the enactment of SAB 101 and zero otherwise, to repeat our 
analyses. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. p-values are based on two-tailed tests, with standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 8 
Propensity Score Matching Analysis  
 
Panel A: The first stage 
The regression model is: 
Cscore_D=β0+β1FRQi,t-1+β2MtBi,t-1+β3Sizei,t-1+β4Quicki,t-1+β5Leveragei,t-1+β6Dividendi,t-1+β7stdCFOi,t-1+β8stdSales-
i,t-1+β9Tangiblei,t-1+β10Lossi,t-1+β11Instii,t-1+β12stdNetHirei,t-1+β13LaborIntensityi,t-1+β14Unioni,t 1+β15AbInvesti,t+ 
β16MAScorei,t+εi,t                                                                                                    (6)   
 
 
Variables 
 
Coeff. 
 
Aggregate 
Z-stat 
Intercept 16.769 *** 83.85 
FRQt-1 -1.007 *** -5.04 
MtB t-1 -1.536 *** -7.68 
Sizet-1 -2.588 *** -12.94 
Quickt-1 -0.121   -0.61 
Leveraget-1 5.884 *** 29.42 
Dividendt-1 -0.671 *** -3.36 
stdCFOt-1 1.111 *** 5.56 
stdSalest-1 -0.614 *** -3.07 
Tangiblet-1 0.580 *** 2.90 
Losst-1 0.654 *** 3.27 
stdNetHiret-1 -2.183 *** -10.91 
LaborIntensityt-1 8.869 *** 44.35 
Uniont-1 -0.580 *** -2.90 
Instit-1 -2.578 *** -12.89 
abInvestt-1 -5.941 *** -29.70 
MAScoret-1 -0.143 
 
-0.71 
Average R2 58.56% 
 
 
Panel B: The second stage  
Variables Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept 0.168 *** 4.59 
Cscore-1 -0.016 *** -2.99 
FRQt-1 -0.005  -0.52 
MtB t-1 0.002 * 1.68 
Sizet-1 -0.009 *** -3.59 
Quickt-1 0.023 *** 12.11 
Leveraget-1 0.015  1.00 
Dividendt-1 -0.032 *** -4.33 
stdCFOt-1 0.089  
1.50 
stdSalest-1 0.034 *** 3.42 
Tangiblet-1 -0.012  -1.21 
Losst-1 0.023 *** 3.52 
stdNetHiret-1 0.032 ** 2.19 
LaborIntensityt-1 -0.043  -1.40 
Uniont-1 -0.074  -1.63 
Instit-1 -0.028 ** -2.15 
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abInvestt-1 0.121 *** 4.31 
MAScoret-1 -0.020 * -1.70 
Year Fixed Effects Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Adj. R2 16.18% 
N 4,388 
This table presents the results of propensity score matching analysis. In panel A, the first stage ordered logistic 
regression estimates of the determinants of conservatism. Cscore_D equals one if a firm’s Cscore is above the 
industry-year median and zero otherwise. Column (1) reports the average coefficient estimate across year-specific 
estimation from 1986 through 2014. Column (2) reports an aggregate z-statistic, which is calculated as the sum of the 
individual annual z-statistics divided by the square root of the number of years over which model (6) is estimated 
(Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 2010). This aggregated z-statistic assumes that each annual estimation is independent 
of the other estimations. Panel B shows the results of using the propensity-score matching method to examine the 
association between labor investment inefficiency and conservatism. Coefficients are presented with t-statistics based 
on firm-clustered standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, for one-tailed 
tests where there are predictions and two-tailed tests otherwise All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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TABLE 9 
Abnormal Net Hiring and Future Performance 
The regression model: 
ΔROAiavg(t+1,t+2,t+3)=β0+β1absNetHireit+β2Cscore it+β3absNetHireit*Cscoreit+ 
(γ1+γ2NetDFEit+γ3NegDFEit*DFEit+γ4PosDFEit*DFEit)*DFEit +(λ1+λ2NegCEit+λ3NegCEit*CEit+ 
λ4PosCEit*CEit)*CEit+εit                                                                                                                                                                      (7) 
 
Variables 
 
   
(1) 
Dependent Variable =  
Change in ROA at t+1 
 
(2) 
Dependent Variable =  
Average change in ROA 
over next 3 years 
Coeff.  t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept 0.006 * 1.80 0.000 * -0.36 
AbsAbNetHire -0.062 *** -6.78 -0.023 *** -6.38 
Cscore -0.059 *** -5.35 0.002 
 
0.38 
AbsAbNetHire*sCscore 0.190 *** 3.90 0.040 ** 2.01 
DFE -0.210 *** -3.97 -0.183 *** -8.76 
NegDFE -0.018 *** -4.73 -0.004 *** -2.67 
NegDFE*DFE -0.164 *** -2.65 -0.076 *** -3.10 
NegDFE*DFE*DFE 0.128 *** 9.94 0.027 *** 5.77 
PosDFE*DFE*DFE -1.178 *** -7.54 -0.362 *** -5.17 
CE 0.008  0.44 0.028 
 
3.63 
NegCE -0.018 *** -5.78 -0.004 *** -3.18 
NegCE*CE -0.256 *** -6.66 -0.065 *** -4.19 
NegCE*CE*CE -0.079 *** -6.71 -0.024 *** -5.51 
PosCE*CE*CE 0.059 *** 8.30 0.014 *** 4.27 
Adj. R2 13.00% 20.00% 
No. Obs. 29,356 25,134 
This table presents the results of estimating model (7) to examine the effect of abnormal net hiring on future 
performance. All variables are as defined in Appendix A. p-values are based on two-tailed tests, with standard errors 
clustered by firm. 
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TABLE 10 
The Role of Unionized Labor  
The regression model: 
AbsAbNetHiret = β0+β1Cscoreit-1+β2FRQit-1+β3MtBit-1+β4Sizeit-1+β5Quickit-1+β6Leverageit-1+β7Dividendit-1+ 
β8stdCFOit-1+β9stdSalesit-1+β10Tangibleit-1+β11Lossit-1+β12Instiit-1+β13stdNetHireit-1+β14LaborIntensityit-1+ 
β15Unionit-1+β16AbInvestit+εit                                                                                                                                           (5) 
 
  
Variables 
 
(1) 
All firms 
(2) 
Firms with positive  
expected net hiring 
(3) 
Firms with negative 
expected net hiring 
Coeff.  t-stat Coeff.  t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
High Unionization Subsample 
Cscore -0.037 ** -2.53 -0.077 *** -3.81 0.019  1.00 
Control Variables   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Adj. R2   23.82%   22.23%   29.12% 
N   18,677   12,799   5,878 
Low Unionization Subsample 
Cscore -0.074 *** -3.35 -0.074 *** -2.67 -0.056  -1.56 
Control Variables   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Adj. R2   24.26%   23.89%   2.77 
N   13,188   9,825   3,363 
This table presents the results of estimating model (5) for subsamples based on unionization and the sign of expected 
net hiring. Unionization is measured at the industry level. Variables are defined in Appendix A. All p-values are 
based on two-tailed tests.  
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Table 11 
Considering Job Adjustment Cost 
The regression model: 
AbsAbNetHiret = β0+β1Cscoreit-1+β2FRQit-1+β3MtBit-1+β4Sizeit-1+β5Quickit-1+β6Leverageit-1+β7Dividendit-1+ 
β8stdCFOit-1+β9stdSalesit-1+β10Tangibleit-1+β11Lossit-1+β12Instiit-1+β13stdNetHireit-1+β14LaborIntensityit-1+ 
β15Unionit-1+β16AbInvestit+εit                                                                                                                                           (5) 
 
 
 
Variables 
(1) 
Low  
Job Adjustment Costs 
(2) 
High 
Job Adjustment Costs 
Coeff.  t-stat Coeff.  t-stat 
Intercept 0.052 *** 2.73 0.057 *** 3.16 
Cscoret-1 -0.024 * -1.72 -0.071 *** -3.26 
FRQt-1 -0.014 *** -3.71 -0.010 * -1.80 
MtB t-1 0.007 *** 3.50 0.002  1.38 
Sizet-1 -0.009 *** -7.79 -0.008 *** -5.38 
Quickt-1 0.027 *** 16.91 0.028 *** 34.13 
Leveraget-1 0.048 *** 5.23 0.063 *** 5.71 
Dividendt-1 -0.015 *** -4.93 -0.007  -1.56 
stdCFOt-1 0.230 *** 6.07 0.178 *** 4.54 
stdSalest-1 0.008  1.41 0.016 ** 2.16 
Tangiblet-1 -0.010 ** -1.97 -0.006  -1.31 
Losst-1 0.031 *** 9.16 0.039 *** 9.62 
stdNetHiret-1 0.070 *** 7.29 0.056 *** 5.20 
LaborIntensityt-1 -0.003  -0.16 0.432 *** 3.44 
Uniont-1 -0.044 *** -2.93 0.043  1.00 
Instit-1 -0.015 ** -2.41 -0.025 *** -2.86 
abInvestt-1 0.009  1.63 -0.009  -1.38 
MAScore 0.108 *** 7.04 0.056 *** 3.50 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 26.57% 20.04% 
N 16,001 15,864 
Difference between firms with low vs. high job adjustment costs: 
(t-stat=-1.77, p<0.1) 
This table presents the results of estimating model (5) for low vs. high job adjustment cost subsamples. Job 
adjustment costs are measured based on the industry-specific index of reliance on skilled labors. Details are 
discussed in section 5.4.3. All variables are defined in Appendix A. All p-values are based on two-tailed tests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
